Luis A. Rivera
Sergeant Major, 11Z5O
HHC 1-14 Infantry Regiment
Operation Baton Rouge
Samara, Iraq
September 28, 2004- October 15, 2004
USASMA Class 57
Unclassified
Position Held: First Sergeant
Abstract
My personal experience paper will cover Task Force 1-14th Infantry participation in Operation Baton Rouge. This mission took place in the city of Samarra, Iraq. It will focus on the unit ability to successfully accomplish the mission with little time to plan for the operation. The unit was at less than 100 percent strength due to Soldiers being on rest and recuperation. The paper will briefly explain how the key tasks for the operation were completed with minimal guidance through the unit’s effective standard operating procedures (SOPs). It will demonstrate how cross training at all levels provided leaders with the flexibility to fill key positions to accomplish the mission.
Operation Baton Rouge
I am a Hispanic soldier that enlisted in the army on March 1983 with the intent to serve 3 year in the armed forces to achieve financial stability and earn educational benefits for a college education. My early successes in the army help me to quickly advance through the enlisted ranks and influenced my decision to make a career in the military. I have served in the army for 23 years in leadership positions from Team Leader to Operations Sergeant Major. The time that served in those leadership positions provided me the knowledge necessary to train soldiers and the ability to lead them in times of war.
During my military training and institutional education leaders at all levels always placed great emphasis on the leaders ability to adapt to changes. They also placed great deal of importance in the backward planning, flexibility, and implementing systems or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to quickly and effectively execute tasks with little or no guidance.
On January 2004, while serving as the First Sergeant for HHC 1-14th Infantry our unit was deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom II. After our unit arrival into theater we were stationed at FOB Warrior in Kirkuk, Iraq. Under the leadership of the 2-25th Infantry Brigade, the 1-14th Infantry Battalion took control and immediately started conducting combat operations in the area of responsibility. During the period of February 2004 thru October 2004, HHC 1-14th participated in the battalion combat operations in the cities of Tuz, Dakuk, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Najaf. On October 2004 all the military training, education, and experience that I obtained in my 20 years military career was put to test.
On September 28, 2004 at approximately 1900 our unit received orders to deploy to Samara, Iraq to participate in Operation Baton Rouge. We were given 13 hours to assemble the personnel, load the equipment, and to deploy to Samara, Iraq to participate in an attack to liberate the city from the insurgent control.
At the moment the order was issue our unit was operating at 66% strength due to rest and recuperation (R & R) leave. In our company this posed a great challenge since the headquarter company was the largest element in the battalion and included the key leadership in the battalion: battalion commander and his staff, and the battalion support elements: mortar, support, scouts, and anti- armor platoons. The rest and recuperation program had a significant impact in the Soldier’s moral and the division commander’s guidance was to allow every Soldier to participate in the program.
In order to comply with the division commander guidance and still remain an effective combat fighting force we developed a comprehensive R & R plan. The plan required the cross training of all Soldiers to fill key leadership positions and the ability of the unit members to operate several weapons systems and perform multiple jobs. Soldiers of all ranks and military operational skills (MOS) were trained on the maintenance, operation, and employment of all the weapons systems assigned to the unit. The training allowed the unit leadership the ability to employ one of the principles of war, flexibility. The added flexibility improved the unit ability to effectively execute combat missions even when operating below 100 % strength.
When the order was received the unit quickly decided to conduct the mission in three phases:
Phase One: The loading and movement of personnel and equipment.
Phase Two: The link up with adjacent units and execution of combat operations.
Phase Three: The assembling, loading, and redeployment of personnel and equipment to FOB Warrior in Kirkuk, Iraq.
The Movement Phase was broken down into two parts and began with Task Force 1-14 Infantry departing FOB Warrior on 29 0001 October 2004. In order to deploy to the area of the operation the soldiers and equipment had to be assembled, packed, manifested, and loaded. The assembling of the personnel was quickly accomplished through the unit established accountability standards. When soldier left the platoon area they were required to move with a battle buddy and to sign out specifying the location and expected time of return. This made possible the quick rally of all soldiers.
The packing of the Soldiers equipment was another important task to accomplish in order to deploy. The battalion packing SOP required B and C bags to be packed at all times with the standard packing list. The SOP minimized the packing time and reduced confusion in the accomplishment of the task.
In less than four hours, part one of phase one was conducted through rotary wings aircraft. Soldiers and their combat equipment were transported to FOB Remagen in the outskirts of Tikrit, Iraq. At the same time part two of phase one was being conducted with all ground assets.
With a short notice and the importance of the mission, the Soldiers initiative and the leaders ability to execute task with little or no guidance the established standard operating procedures (SOP) was the key to the unit’s ability to complete this phase. The movement phase was completed when the task force air and ground elements linked up at FOB Remagen. Immediately after the Soldiers arrival a 100 percent accountability of personnel and equipment was conducted and the phase two of the operation began.
The phase two of the Operation Baton Rouge started within two hours of Task Force 1-14th Infantry arrival to FOB Remagen by assembling a reconnaissance and security element to conduct a reconnaissance of the objective. While the reconnaissance was being conducted other troop leaders procedures were being performed in preparations for the mission. Soldiers conducted rehearsals, prepared equipment, and conducted pre-combat inspections.
In the early morning hours of Friday, 1 October 2004 the assault phase of Operation Baton Rouge began. The assault to free the city of Samara from an estimated two hundred to five hundred rebels included 3,000 U.S. and 2,000 Iraqi troops. The operation was the prelude to future battle in tougher strong hold like Baghdad and Fallujah.
The success of the Samara Operation was expected to increase the possibility of success in the future operations. When the fighting started it was very difficult with Soldiers sweating it out in heavy fighting in streets full of smoke and the sound of weapon fire from helicopters, machine guns and small arms weapons. The fighting went on for approximately twelve hours. Soldiers had to clear buildings and at times seek cover in fighting positions with the remains of dead insurgents killed by U.S. Soldier’s fire. The fighting continued throughout the afternoon when the Task Force Dragon reached their objective on the western edge of the city. The attack reportedly produced more than 100 insurgents killed and resulted in the city quick return to military control.
After seizing the objective, Task Force Dragon began patrolling the western sector to establish security and control in the city. At the same time logistic and administrative operations moved to the forefront in the priority list. The re-supply of ammunition, food, and water after the intensive fighting was critical to the success of future operation.
Recovery and repair of damaged weapons and equipment became the focal point of the operation for the support platoon. They were operating at 66 percent personnel strength due to rest and recovery leave and had to be augmented with food service and administrative personnel in order to accomplish the mission. The non-combat arms MOS Soldiers filled the positions of drivers and machine gunners. The ability to fill key positions with non-combat arms MOS soldiers made possible the delivery of tons of supplies and aided in the success of the sustainment operations.
After the reestablishment of military control in the city of Samara the Task Force Dragon conducted the phase three of the operation with ground tactical convoy and air movement of the personnel returning safely to FOB Warrior in Kirkuk, Iraq. The phase three of the mission was concluded when the 100 percent accountability of the personnel and equipment was accomplished. The task force sustained two wounded Soldiers and zero lost of life during the mission. The accountability of personnel and equipment was facilitated by established guidelines for pre-combat inspections and pre-combat checks in the unit SOP.
Some of the lessons learned during this operation are:
1. The success of operation is greatly influenced by the unit’s ability to adapt to changes.
2. The Soldier’s technical and tactical expertise provides the flexibility to fill machine gunners, drivers, and key leadership positions.
3. The leader’s ability to develop and implement SOP’s and systems to perform tasks with little or no guidance increases the unit’s ability to succeed in the assigned mission.
It is imperative that we continue doing tough and realistic training at the operational level to ensure the development of the Soldiers. The leaders development at all level must be a priority through institutional training during peacetime and efforts should be made to continue the training even during deployments. Victory during war can only be achieved through the utmost effort during peacetime.